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In response to the tax limitation movement which received
national attention with the passage of California's Proposition 13 and which gave rise to a slate of tax limitation
referenda on the Michigan ballot in 1978, we began a theoretical and empirical study of the relationship between the
size of state and local governing units and issues in public
finance.

The Theoretical Work
The Size of Government and the Limits Thereon

The theoretical investigation focused on two questions:
whether there are natural limits to the size of government
when public sector employees are well organized to advance
their own interests and whether, given that local governments use more resources than might be considered ideal,
tax limitation is an effective remedy. Although government
may be considered too large because of its intrusiveness i to
private affairs or its wastefulness, we restricted our study to
situations in which government either produces more public
output than voters would choose freely or those in which
public employees are paid more than they would be in the
free market.
The bulk of the academic literature on excessive government spending has been concerned with excess public
output, taking the level of public sector wages as given and
concentrating on developing theories that would explain
why the public sector engages in more activity than would
be optimal. In contrast, our first theoretical paper in this area
deals with the interaction between public employee bargaining power over wages and the size of government spending.
The general view has been that public wage growth and
public employment growth are complements. As public
wages rise, there is an incentive for workers to join the public sector. As this increased population of public employees
votes for sympathetic political candidates , the probability
that such candidates get elected rises , and public employees
are rewarded with wage increases. The process appears to be
unstable, leading to ever-higher levels of public wages, public employment, and tax rates.
While not denying the existence of political interactions of
this sort, we have tried to put fears of a large and growing
government sector into perspective by focusing on the economic aspects of the problem. We assume that private
employees are free to leave a community in response to
rising costs for public output and that when they leave, the
tax base falls . This , combined with the fact that public budgets are financed through taxes paid by both public and
private employees, implies that there is a real- constraint on
the extent to which public employees can raise their wages.
As their wages increase and private employees leave the
community, revenue resulting from property taxes could fall
by so much that the higher tax rates needed to pay these
wages would lower after-tax public wages.
As public employment rises , the public wage might also
rise for a time because of the growing political power of
public employee unions . However, that rise would only be
temporary, because an upper constraint will always be set by
the resultant increase in tax rates , the greater proportion of
public employees in the population, and consequent lowering of the after-tax income of public employees.
Extensions of the Model
The basic theoretical model can be used to consider how
important public employees' voting power can be in affecting the level of government spending. One byproduct of our
work in this area is based on the observation that in order
for public employees to bias the outcomes of referenda, they
must have different preferences for public spending from
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private employees. Only then will different voting turnout
rates matter.

The Effect of Tax Llmitation
We have considered in some detail the effects of tax limitations on the economic well-being of residents in
jurisdictions that operate under such limitations. Our study
indicates that tax limitation may either improve or reduce
economic welfare, depending on the causes of excessive
government size. If government is seen as too large because
public employees receive wages that exceed the competitive
private sector wage, but private employees choose the optimum level of government output, then tax limitation can
lead to reductions in the welfare of both private and public
employees. If the opposite case holds, namely that public
employees are paid market wages but are somehow able to
produce more output than would be competitively determined, then tax limitation (at least over some range) will
improve the welfare of private employees. Where government's excessive size is a combination of the two phenomena, the effect of tax limitation is ambiguous-it could go
either way.

The Empirical Findings

The Data
In November 1978 Michigan voters were faced with three
constitutional tax limitation proposals on the ballot. In light
of the widely perceived "taxpayer revolt" stemming from the
then recent passage of Proposition 13 in California , the
Michigan proposals provided an ideal natural opportunity to
determine why people vote for such proposals and what
they assume the effects will be. We also wanted to know
whether public employees are able to bias the outcomes of
elections in their own interest, whether the preferences of
nonvoters are well represented by those who do vote, what
determines the demand for local public services, and what
factors differentiate people who vote for tax limitation from
its opponents. In particular we were interested in the nature,
causes, and extent of voter dissatisfaction with the budget
performance of state and local governments. Did this dissatisfaction represent a conservative push toward smaller, or
limited, levels of government spending, or did it reflect the
voters' feeling that they may be able to lower their tax bills
without undergoing a reduction in public services? In more
formal terms, our study provided an opportunity to answer a
question that is puzzling in light of the degree to which
budgets, especially at the local level, are already directly
influenced by voters: why would these voters add amendments to the state constitution to constrain the behavior
of themselves and of their elected representatives?
In order to answer these questions, we conducted a telephone survey of a random sample of 2001 Michigan
residents. The survey was performed in the three weeks
immediately after the election, and questions were asked
about respondents' voting in the recent election, past voting
behavior. political affiliation, income, family characteristics,
tax payments, and perceptions about the state of the world
and the impact of the proposed amendments.
Our analysis concentrated on two limitation amendments.
The Headlee Amendment, which passed with 52 percent
of the overall vote. was essentially a limitation on the behavior of the state government. It limited state revenues
(exclusive of federal aid) to a constant share of state personal
income, while prohibiting the state from mandating expenditures on local governments without paying for them. It also
placed a constraint on local fiscal behavior: property tax
levies on existing property could not grow at a ra e in excess

of the inflation rate as measured by the Consumer Price
Index without tax rates being cut automatically. However,
these automatic cuts in rates could be prevented by an
explicit local referendum on the matter.
The Tisch Amendment, which was defeated because it
received only 36 percent of the vote, would have been essentially a local limitation-requiring a large cut in the assessed
value of property. Along with other restrictions on tax rates
already in the Michigan constitution, this limitation would
have forced property tax revenue cuts in some , though not
all, communities. It also would have placed a slight constraint on the fiscal behavior of the state government by
limiting the state income tax rate , but other revenue sources
would have not been restricted. Hence, the Headlee Amendment was a limit on state taxing behavior with a modest
constraint on the behavior of some localities , while the Tisch
Amendment drastically limited the fiscal behavior of many,
but not all, localities and placed a slight constraint on state
taxing behavior.
The third limitation amendment on the Michigan ballot in
1978, one that we asked about in our survey but found too
complex to analyze, called for an educational voucher plan
to finance local education but left almost all details of this
complex plan unspecified. It received only 25 percent of the
vote.
Preferences for Public Spending
The most striking empirical result from the survey is that
by and large citizens of Michigan did not wish to restrict
current levels of output of either state and local governments. Indeed, with the exception of spending on welfare
programs, there is a decided sentiment for expansion (and a
stated willingness to pay for expansion) in all of the program
areas for which responses were elicited. To the extent that
there is a taxpayer revolt in Michigan, it would seem to be a
revolt against welfare spending . Ironically, that is a type of
spending that in Michigan, as in most other states , is
financed about equally by the federal government and by
state and local governments.
This characterization of the voters is strengthened when
we consider stated preferences regarding state and local
spending as a whole. For each of the two levels of government, respondents were informed of the major functional
responsibilites of the respective levels and were then asked
if they would favor an across-the-board increase or decrease
or no change in both spending and taxes. assuming that
all spending and tax categories were to be changed proportionately. Furthermore, those voters who favored an acrossthe-board increase or decrease in spending and taxes were
asked to give their desired percentage amount. The mean
percentage change desired is very close to zero, only -3 .53
percent at the state level and -0.22 percent at the local
level. These mean changes are small both absolutel and
relative to the within-group standard deviations. Indeed , for
both levels of government, the median desired change as
zero. Since more than half the respondents e pressed a
desire for no change at both levels of government, the
median respondent is apparently happy with the status quo
at both the state and local levels.
It is perhaps unwise to take these results too seriousl
because so many voters e pressed preference for no change
in the amount of public spending-over half the sample
at both the state and local level. One might argue that some
of the voters preferring the status quo were really either
uninformed or unable to comprehend the question. To see
how sensitive our results were to tl1is possibility we omitted
voters preferring the status quo and recalculated the means
and medians , obtaining mean and median desired percentage changes of -7.8 and -8.3 at the state level and -0.5
and 4.5 at the local level. Even this strong correction- urel
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an o erreaction because some of those choosing no change
must have truly felt that wa -did not give ery large reductions in desired state spending and had ver modest impacts
at the local level. The clear conclusion is that at least as
respondents answer explicit questions , there appears to be a
desire for only a modest cutback in state spending and
essentially no change in local spending . We might also predict that a statewide tax limitation amendment like Headlee
would have a better chance of passage than a local limitation
amendment like Tisch. but that gets ahead of our story.

Preferences of Different Groups
The finding that residents are generally satisfied with the
status quo does not change very much when we examine the
preferences of voters with particular demographic and economic characteristics. Federal government employees living
in the state want the least state expenditures , while blacks
want the smallest cuts. However, even blacks would like
slightly less spending than is now undertaken-and the difference between the two groups is only about five percentage
points . The results are similar for local expenditures: federal
government employees are among the most negative and
blacks the most positive. In this case. however, blacks do
support increases in local spending , as do a few other subcategories of the population.
Despite the relative uniformity of responses , there were
some important differences among groups which conform
with prior e pectations. Of greatest interest to us, in light of
our concern with the political effects of private versus public
sector employment, is the role of the employment status
variable. Private sector voters want less state and local public spending than those in the public sector, especially when
federal government employees are counted in the private
sector. Nevertheless, the finding that employment status does
affect attitudes toward government spending does not
change the fact that the differences are small.

Explaining Votes with Preferences

Until now we have discussed state and local public spending demands. The next question is whether these spending
demands themselves can predict the vote on the Headlee
and Tisch Amendments . The results generally do correspond
to prior e ' pectations . Only 36 percent of those desiring more
state spending and taxes voted for Headlee, while 67 percent
of those desiring less state spending and taxes voted for the
amendment. For Tisch the same percentages were 16 and 45 ,
respectively. The fact that 51 percent of those desiring the
same spending and tax levels supported Headlee may be
surprising if Headlee is interpreted as altering the status quo ,
but these voters could have interpreted Headlee as preventing further growth of government spending as a proportion
of income and thus as preserving the status quo.

Perceptions About Tax Limitations

The statistical analysis shows , however, that spending
preferences alone do not provide a very powerful explanation of tax limitation voting. We tried to do better by examining the interaction of spending preferences with perceptions
about the likely impact of the limitation amendments .
To do this we used answers to a series of perception questions which followed the format: "Do you think the passage
of the Headlee (Tisch) proposal will lead to :
a) a reduction in the overall level of taxes in Michigan
b) a reduction in property taxes
c) an increase in income taxes
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d) a reduction in the number of state and local government employees
e) a reduction in the funds available to the local public
school system
f) a reduction in the future wage increases of government
employees?"
These questions were followed by the open-ended question of what respondents thought would be the most
important impact of the amendment. Perhaps giving choices
listed as a) to f) increased the probability of one of our
answers being selected as the most important impact, but
other responses were possible and were quite frequently
given.
Our data indicate that spending preferences and perceptions about the likely impact of the amendment should be
considered jointly in explaining votes. If, for example, a
voter desired less spending and also perceived that the
Headlee amendment would lower public spending, the voter
should support the amendment. If the voter had the same
perception but desired more spending , the voter should vote
against the amendment.
We have constructed statistical models based on this conclusion to explain the vote on both amendments along these
lines. The variable to be explained was coded as "one" if
the voter voted for the amendment and "zero" if against. The
explanatory variables were a series interactions of preference
and perception, patterned on the above example. Whenever
relevant, the variables were further split according to
whether voters were in the public or private sector and,
hence, would view an outcome such as lower government
wages or employment differently. For these purposes all
nonworking respondents were considered as private, since
they would still pay property and sales taxes, as were all
working in the federal government. All those working and
nonworking respondents with either the respondent or
spouse working in the state or local public sector, about 11
percent of the sample, were considered public.
The first thing to be noticed is that the explanatory power
of this model is much improved over the case in which
just spending preferences were calculated without regard to
perceptions about the amendment. Most of the variables
are statistically significant and more or less internally consistent, though in some cases puzzling . For example. among
the voter-respondents who perceived that the most important
impact of the Headlee Amendment would be to reduce government spending, those wanting less state spending and
taxes voted heavily for the amendment, as would be
expected. Those wanting more state spending and taxes
were evenly split on the amendment. Among those who felt
that the Headlee Amendment would have tax reduction as
its most important impact, support was very strong for the
amendment, even among voters who favored maintaining
the current level of state spending and taxes. The obvious
explanation for this behavior is that these voters felt that
taxes could be cut without a reduction in spending.
We might even imagine a motive based on uncertainty
about the impact of the amendment: voters feel fairly certain
their taxes will be cut but much less certain that public services affecting them will be. Whatever the case, such
uncertainty is mirrored among the cynics who felt the most
important impact of the amendment would be to increase
taxes. These voters were strongly inclined to vote against the
amendment whatever their spending preference.
Far and away the strongest support for the amendment
came from those who felt that it would increase either governmental efficiency or voter control of government. There
are 120 voters in these categories, and ninety percent of
them voted for the amendment.
Regarding the wages of public employees, while very few
public or private voters felt limitation of future government
wage increases would be the most important impact of the

amendment. many felt it would have that impact. Among
public sector voters, votes went against Headlee regardless of
whether these workers felt that public wages were above
those for comparable private sector jobs. Among private
sector voters, those who felt that public wages are higher
than private were fairly neutral on the amendment, but those
who felt that public wages are lower than private opposed
it. Certainly among private sector voters there appears to be
little resentment directed against high wages of government
employees and little voting for tax limitation on that
account. Whether this result would obtain in other states is
uncertain; perhaps the union solidarity tradition is very
strong in Michigan.
The public employment findings also demonstrate the
nonpunitive feelings of private sector voters . Among those
who felt the amendment would reduce government employment, such voters opposed or were neutral about the
amendment , even if they felt that public employees worked
less hard than private employees. On this issue, however,
public employees show some mysterious devotion to the
common interest. Those who felt the amendment would
lower employment and that government workers did not
work as hard as private workers supported the amendment.
Presumably they felt the other guy would get laid off.
Finally, voters who felt the amendment would hurt schools
were heavily against it even if they favored less school
spending, and those who felt it would increase governmental efficiency or voter control were much more favorably
inclined.
When we consider the Headlee amendment and compare
its nverall plurality with the pluralities it received among
groups of voters identified by voter perceptions of its most
important impact, we can see the extent to which passage of
tax limitation amendments reflects each of three motives:
reduction of public spending , lowering of public sector
wages , and gains in government efficiency.
In our sample of Headlee voters. 578 voted for the amendment and 450 against, giving an overall plurality of 128
votes . This plurality was small or negative among those who
want lower wages , those who want no change, and those
who did not respond . Among all these groups the net plurality was -36 votes . Hence. the passage of the amendment
can be attributed to the plurality of 128 + 36 = 164 votes
among the other groups. Among these groups , those who
wanted a smaller public sector accounted for a 43 vote plurality. Those who were looking either for efficiency gains
or for a free lunch were responsible for a 41 vote plurality,
and those who were clearly looking for a gain in efficiency
or control accounted for an 80 vote plurality. Hence, three
out of four voters responsible for the plurality of the Headlee
Amendment were motivated either by a desire for a free
lunch or for genuine efficiency gains . Only one out of four
appears to favor a smaller-sized public sector where both
spending and taxes are reduced .

Implications of the Tax Limitation Vote

Surveys are always somewhat suspect, in part because one
never knows if one has asked the "right" questions and in
part because respondents do not have to act on the basis of
their answers . Allowing for these limitations, however, our
analysis of the tax limitation vote leads to the following
conclusions.
• The tax limitation movement is not primarily an attempt
to correct public sector versus private sector spending
imbalances. Although more people think that government is too large than believe it is too small. the
differences are not substantial and are also not strongly
related to reported voting behavior.

• The tax limitation vote does not appear to be an attempt
to "punish" public employees for earning wages that
exceed those of private sector workers.
• There is a strong correlation between the desire for both
more control over government and more efficient government and votes for tax limitation.
• The perception that tax limitation will reduce taxes is
strongly associated with affirmative votes, even among
voters who express a preference for government that
is no smaller than the status quo. Such voters may perceive that their own taxes will be cut but that the
difference will be made up by gain in governmental
efficiency, or they may be searching for the ever-elusive
"free lunch."

Do Public Employees Exert Disproportionate Political Power?
The survey analysis also provided us with some interesting results concerning the voting process and the role of the
public employee vote in particular. If public employees
can affect their own wages, they have a special incentive to
vote for higher public spending. We sought to discover how
powerful they are in effecting their own desired budget
outcome as opposed to that desired by private voters.
If bureaucrats and private citizens have the same opinions ,
bureaucrats' possible power will not matter. The outcome of
the vote will be the private sector's desired outcome, regardless of the turnout rates of government bureaucrats. If
preferences are different, differential power does matter and
matters increasingly as the share of bureaucrats in the total
vote population goes up . The conventional •..visdom is that
bureaucrats exert disproportionate power both because their
turnout rates are high and because they hold special views.
In fact , this conventional wisdom is based on surprisingly
limited empirical information. Most economists writing
on the subject cite an analysis of voters in a 1933 municipal
election in Austin , Texas. This study found an 87 percent
bureaucratic turnout rate and a 53 percent private employer
rate but did not measure attitude differences.
We used our voting data to expand on that study, measuring both participation and voting differences. Federal
government workers had lower voting participation than
private workers. State government employees voted with
about the same frequency as those in the private sector.
Local government employees and those public workers who
were paid substantially less in the public sector than they
would be by private employers had significantly higher rates
of voter participation than private voters . Collectively, public
workers have higher turn out rates in elections that concern
them directly than to private voters.
Given all this factual information and working with both
an inclusive and a narrowly restricted definition of public
employees. we learned that the vote against the Headlee
Amendment was between 2.2 and 4.3 percentage points
higher than it would have been had only private employees
been voting on the amendment. To get a sense of the impact
of such a percentage increase in the vote , we used data gathered about millage elections in 17 Michigan school districts
between 1959 and 1961 and between 1969 and 1971 . We
were able to conclude that the percent of election successes
that would have been failed because of the 4 .3 percent point
bias was 9 .7 percent in 1959-61 and 10.6 percent in 1969-71 ,
with correspondingly smaller proportions if the bias were
closer to 2 .2 percent. These results are clearly nontrivial.
Nevertheless, the impact of biases of this sort on overall
levels of spending on education is likely to be rather small.
If it were to become significant. there is nothing to prevent
private voters organizing to counteract the higher degree
of organization of public employees.
27

Summary and Implications

On the issues of whether government is seen as too large
and whether mechanisms exist to prevent the unchecked
growth of state and local government, we are quite confident. based on both our theoretical and empirical work. in
concluding that:
• The overall size of state and local government in Michigan is at most slightly greater than would be desired
by the voting-age population.
• At least in principle (especially in large metropolitan
areas) the fact that population is mobile across jurisdictions imposes powerful limits on the degree to which
public employees can combine market and voting power
to expand the size of the public sector.
• Public employees have stronger preferences for public
spending and have higher turnout rates in relevant elections than do private employees. Moreover, both the
preferences and the turnout rates are positively associated with a measure of the degree to which public
employees receive wages that are higher than they
would get in the private sector. Thus , public employees
do bias the outcomes of local referenda and seem to
do so in part in their own self-interest (rather than just
because they favor a larger public sector). However,
the magnitude of the bias is relatively small.
Regarding the causes and consequences of tax limitations
themselves, our results are somewhat more ambiguous:
• Given that government is of excessive size, tax limitation
will be effective in increasing the welfare of private
sector employees only in certain circumstances.
• Votes for tax limitation are not strongly related to the
economic and demographic characteristics of voters.
Rather, the key determinants of votes are voters' perceptions of what the consequences of the limitation will
prove to be. These perceptions , in turn, are also quite
randomly distributed across different groups in the population. Thus, an understanding of the vote for tax
limitation will require research into how such perceptions are formed .
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